We consider a cellular network where mobile transceiver devices that are owned by self-interested users are incentivized to cooperate with each other using tokens, which they exchange electronically to "buy" and "sell" downlink relay services, thereby increasing the network's capacity compared to a network that only supports base station-to-device (B2D) communications. We investigate how an individual device in the network can learn its optimal cooperation policy online, which it uses to decide whether or not to provide downlink relay services for other devices in exchange for tokens. We propose a supervised learning algorithm that devices can deploy to learn their optimal cooperation strategies online given their experienced network environment. We then systematically evaluate the learning algorithm in various deployment scenarios. Our simulation results suggest that devices have the greatest incentive to cooperate when the network contains (i) many devices with high energy budgets for relaying, (ii) many highly mobile users (e.g., users in motor vehicles), and (iii) neither too few nor too many tokens. Additionally, within the token system, self-interested devices can effectively learn to cooperate online, and achieve up to 20 percent throughput gains on average compared to B2D communications alone, all while selfishly maximizing their own utilities.
INTRODUCTION
D EVICE-TO-DEVICE (D2D) communications has recently emerged as a candidate technology for supporting cooperative relaying in mobile broadband networks. By taking advantage of user diversity in space and time, cooperative relaying can simultaneously increase network capacity and decrease delay [2] , which can improve the performance of important applications such as wireless video streaming [4] , [5] . In addition to the aforementioned benefits, D2D relaying is appealing because it does not increase infrastructure costs for the network operator. This is in contrast to infrastructure relay nodes, which are included as a part of the current LTE-Advanced standard [6] . Note that D2D communications is already playing an important role in the unlicensed band via WiFi-Direct [7] . However, its counterpart in the licensed band is far from being fully developed. A preliminary version of D2D communications called LTE-Direct [8] is being standardized for Rel-12 LTE-Advanced mobile broadband networks; however, so far, it is mainly restricted to public safety use [9] . Meanwhile, D2D relaying has not received as much consideration.
Although there are many benefits to D2D relaying, it requires coordination across multiple nodes in the network. This is especially difficult to realize when nodes are cell phones, laptops, or tablets (hereafter, user equipments, or UEs) that are owned by self-interested users, who aim to maximize their own utilities. In particular, most existing work on cooperative communications/relaying implicitly assumes that all network devices are obedient, i.e., they will act as relays whenever requested. In practice, however, since relaying costs energy and provides no tangible benefit to the relay, obliging UEs to serve as relays could quickly lead to widespread user dissatisfaction and, ultimately, loss of customers and revenue for the network operator. Indeed, according to the J.D. Power and Associates 2012 U.S. Wireless Smartphone Customer Satisfaction Study [10] , poor battery life reduces both customer satisfaction and loyalty. Therefore, to realize the potential of D2D relaying in cellular networks, a system must be developed that incentivizes UEs to cooperate while allowing them to act as relays only when it is in their self-interest.
Related Work
D2D communications will play a critical role in future mobile broadband networks. An overview of D2D communications in 3GPP LTE-Advanced standards is presented in [11] . In [12] , [13] , offloading of cellular user sessions onto D2D links in unlicensed bands is considered. It is shown that network-assisted offloading onto D2D links can significantly improve session blocking probabilities and energy efficiency. Multi-hop D2D communications is introduced in [14] . In [15] , stochastic geometry is used to evaluate the capacity for different D2D deployments including overlay in-band, underlay in-band, and out-of-band D2D. In [17] , [18] , [19] , D2D communications is used to support D2D relaying. In [17] , network coding is applied for relay-based communications. In [18] , coverage enhancement and system capacity results are presented for D2D relaying on the uplink and downlink. In [19] , cooperative clustering techniques are combined with opportunistic scheduling to increase network throughput and improve energy efficiency.
While there is a lot of great literature on cooperative relaying in wireless and cellular networks, e.g., [3] , [4] , [5] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , this work does not consider self-interested users that require incentive to cooperate. Nevertheless, many of the techniques and solutions in this literature can be implemented in conjunction with different incentive mechanisms; in this sense, work on cooperative/D2D relaying techniques is complementary to work on incentivizing relaying. Various mechanisms have been proposed to incentivize relaying in ad-hoc, cellular, and peer-to-peer networks. These mechanisms can be roughly grouped into three classes: bandwidth exchange, reputation-based, and token-based mechanisms.
In bandwidth exchange mechanisms, when device A receives relay service from device B, device A immediately delegates a portion of its bandwidth to device B as compensation for relaying [20] , [21] . Variants of bandwidth exchange mechanisms have been proposed based on exchanging transmission time [22] or directly exchanging relay services [23] . Unfortunately, these mechanisms are suboptimal because they require device A to immediately and directly reciprocate to device B, even though device B may not need assistance at the current time or, importantly, may not need assistance from device A. Meanwhile, token-based mechanisms and many reputation-based mechanisms exploit indirect reciprocity [24] , which is based on the idea that device C will relay for device B because device B relayed for device A in the past. Due to this flexibility, indirect reciprocity can achieve better performance than direct reciprocity.
Reputation-based mechanisms enable users to identify noncooperative users so that they can be eliminated as potential relays and/or punished by dropping their packets [24] , [27] , [28] . To identify noncooperative users, each user tracks the other users' reputations based on its first-hand interactions [28] and, in some implementations, second-hand experience obtained through reputation propagation [24] , [27] . Unfortunately, reputation-based mechanisms are not suitable in cellular networks for two reasons. First, they do not scale well because first-hand experience must be tracked for many devices and reliable second-hand reputation information cannot be propagated in a timely fashion. Second, most reputation-based mechanisms rely on the broadcast nature of wireless networks to enable users to monitor each other's transmissions [24] , [27] ; however, omnidirectional broadcasting will become less common in major 4G mobile broadband standards [25] , [26] because they support MIMO and beamforming.
Token-based mechanisms have been proposed to incentivize cooperation in ad-hoc [29] , [30] , [31] , cellular [32] , [33] , and peer-to-peer networks [34] . Electronic tokens work as a virtual currency: users pay tokens to other users in exchange for providing services. Although tokens have been used to incentivize cooperation in cellular networks [32] , [33] , optimal and practical solutions are still far from being developed. For instance, [32] focuses on developing a suitable system model and architecture, but assumes that each UE deploys an arbitrary fixed threshold cooperation policy, which does not depend on its experienced network environment, thereby resulting in suboptimal performance.
In our prior work [33] , we use a token system to incentivize UEs to provide relay services to each other. In particular, we focus on how a system planner can design a token system offline to maximize its efficiency (i.e., the probability that UEs that need help from a relay will get it) within an idealized network operating in equilibrium. We show that, if the expected future benefit of having an additional token outweighs the immediate cost of relaying, then a self-interested UE will be willing to act as a relay; we prove that threshold strategies are the only strategies that a self-interested UE, which wants to maximize its own utility, will adopt; and we determine the optimal token supply that should be deployed in the network to maximize the system's efficiency. This theory is further developed in [35] . While [33] focuses on theoretical formalism, it relies on numerous strong technical assumptions to enable theoretical analysis. In this paper, we work towards operationalizing the theoretical framework developed in [33] so that it can be deployed in real systems (in Section 2.3, after we have introduced our system model, we discuss the key differences in technical assumptions used in [33] and in this paper). In particular, we address how individual UEs can dynamically optimize their cooperation policies in a non-idealized network environment, operating out of equilibrium, which is the dominant operational state of real networks.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we adopt a token-based approach similar to [33] . However, rather than focusing on incentive design from the system designer's perspective, we investigate how the UEs can learn to adapt their cooperation strategies online, which they use to decide whether or not to provide downlink relay services in exchange for tokens. Our contributions are as follows:
We formulate the decision problem faced by each UE, namely, the problem of deciding whether or not to relay, as a Markov decision process (MDP). Each UE's objective is to maximize its long-term utility, which is defined as the difference between (i) the benefits it gains over time by receiving data through a relay and (ii) the energy it expends over time by relaying data for other UEs. Additionally, we assume that each UE has a relay budget that specifies how much energy it is willing to consume relaying data for other UEs. We formulate the MDP such that a UE's optimal 1 cooperation policy not only depends on its distance from the nearest base station, its channel conditions, and its energy budget for relaying, but also on the other UEs' locations and cooperation strategies. In other words, each UE's policy is coupled with both the network environment and the other UEs. We show that the optimal cooperation strategies are threshold in a UE's token holding state, and that the threshold is non-decreasing in the UE's relay budget. We propose a simple, low-complexity, supervised learning algorithm that each UE can deploy to learn its optimal cooperation policy online. In the proposed algorithm, a UE estimates two parameters from its interactions with the network environment, i.e., the frequency with which it is asked to relay data for other UEs and the frequency with which other UEs relay data for it. Using its current estimates of these two parameters, the UE selects its cooperation policy from a pre-computed look-up table. We evaluate the proposed learning algorithm in various deployment scenarios involving UEs with high and low mobility and high and low relay budgets. Our simulation results suggest that UEs have the greatest incentive to cooperate when the network contains many UEs with high relay budgets, many highly mobile users (e.g., users in motor vehicles), and neither too few nor too many tokens.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the system model. In Section 3, we formulate an individual UE's optimization problem. In Section 4, we propose a supervised learning algorithm that each UE can use to learn its optimal cooperation policy online. In Section 5, we present our simulation results. We conclude in Section 6. A list of notation is provided in Table 1 .
SYSTEM MODEL

Downlink Network Model
In this section, we present our downlink network model. For illustration, we use an OFDM-based network model similar to, e.g., LTE/LTE-Advanced or IEEE 802.16 (WiMax); however, the optimization and learning solutions proposed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively, can be applied in other networks such as 3G or ad-hoc networks. We consider a cellular network containing N mobile transceiver devices, which we refer to as user equipments. We assume that time is slotted into discrete time intervals indexed by t 2 N. The time slot duration Dt (seconds) is greater than the amount of time required to determine if a relay transmission is needed, identify an appropriate relay, and complete a relay transmission, but not so long that the UEs' geographic locations or channel conditions change significantly during the time slot. In an LTE network, for example, the time slot duration could be set to the length of one frame (10 ms). 2 In any given time slot t, some UEs are scheduled to receive data from the BS on the downlink; however, some of these UEs may experience bad channel conditions due to path loss and shadowing, which will limit their downlink data rates. In this situation, intermediate UEs can act as D2D relays to help deliver data from the BS to the destination UEs [17] , [18] , [19] . Note that D2D relays are not the same as infrastructure relay nodes, which are included as part of the current LTE-Advanced standard [6] and do not require incentives to relay because they are owned by the operator rather than self-interested users.
For illustration, we consider a two-hop amplify-and-forward relaying strategy using a single intermediate relay (i.e., a transmission from the BS to the relay followed by a transmission from the relay to the destination). Additionally, we use a simple mode and relay selection strategy for deciding when a UE will request a relay and which relay it Outbound relay demand rate, inbound relay demand rate, relay recruitment efficiency, outbound relay success rate a j t , Aðp j Þ, s j ðk j ; p j Þ, K th ðp j Þ Cooperation action, set of cooperation actions, cooperation policy, cooperation policy threshold P j ð½k j0 ; p j0 j½k j ; p j ; a j Þ, u j ðk j ; p j ; a j Þ State transition probability function, expected utility function V j ðk j ; p j Þ, Q j ðk j ; p j ; a j Þ, b
Value function, action-value function, discount factor p j t ,m j t , P, M, C, fðÁÞ, gðÁÞ, hðÁÞ Outbound success rate estimate, inbound relay demand rate estimate; sets of outbound success rates, inbound relay demand rates, and relay costs for policy look-up table; mapping functions.
2. In LTE networks, resources are divided into Resource Blocks, which consist of 12 consecutive 15 kHz subcarriers (a total of 180 kHz) for the duration of one slot (0.5 ms). The smallest schedulable block is two consecutive resource blocks lasting the duration of one subframe (1 ms); however, scheduling can be done less frequently using semipersistent scheduling, e.g., every frame (10 ms) or over multiple frames [36] . To mirror the LTE physical layer, we assume that UEs at the same base station are scheduled over orthogonal time-frequency resources. will select. Importantly, the strategies considered in this paper are for illustration: the optimization/learning framework proposed in Sections 3 and 4 can work with any other relaying, mode selection, and relay selection strategies without significant modification. 3 Before we present our illustrative mode and relay selection strategy in Section 2.1.2, we provide expressions for the achievable transmission rates with and without relay transmission in Section 2.1.1.
Direct and Relay-Assisted Transmission Rates
Let G ij t denote the received signal-to-interference-plusnoise-ratio (SINR) on the link between node i and UE j in time slot t, where node i could be the BS or another UE: i.e.,
where P ij t (W) is the transmission power on link i ! j, g ij t is the channel gain, W ij t (Hz) is the link's bandwidth, N 0 (W/Hz) is the noise power spectral density, and I j t is the inter-cell interference experienced by UE j. In our simulation results (Section 5), we compute the channel gain using path loss and lognormal shadowing as described in [48] , [49] . Equipped with capacity achieving error control codes, the transmission rate on link i ! j in time slot t can be written as
Suppose that, in time slot t, UE j 2 f1; . . . ; Ng is scheduled to receive data from the BS (indexed by 0). UE j can either receive data directly over the B2D link (direct mode) or through an intermediate relay (relay mode). In direct mode, the BS transmits to UE j at the rate r 0j t ¼ W 0j t log 2 ð1 þ G 0j t Þ (bits/s) for Dt seconds. In relay mode, following standard relay channel analysis for amplify-and-forward cooperation [16] , we obtain the following received SINR over the cooperative link:
such that the effective transmission rate from the BS to UE j,
Note that the relay-to-destination link uses the same physical resources as the BS-to-relay link. We discuss this in more detail in the next section.
Illustrative Mode and Relay Selection Strategies
Let U DL t and U UL t denote the sets of UEs that are scheduled on the downlink and uplink, respectively, and let U IDLE t denote the set of idle UEs in time slot t. Note that, since UEs cannot transmit and receive at the same time, U DL t , U UL t , and U IDLE t partition the set of UEs U ¼ f1; . . . ; Ng. The sets of scheduled users, as well as their corresponding resource allocations, can be determined using any scheduling policy (proportional fair, round robin, resource fair, etc.). We let U IDLE t ðjÞ denote the set of idle UEs that are associated with the same BS as UE j. Only UEs in U IDLE t ðjÞ can serve as relays for UE j in time slot t.
Consider UE j 2 U DL t , which is scheduled to receive data from the BS in time slot t over a link with bandwidth W 0j t Hz. We assume that, if the received SINR on the BS-todevice (B2D) link, G 0j t , is above a target threshold G j;target , then the BS will transmit to UE j in the direct mode. Note that, given the allocated bandwidth W 0j t , the target SINR corresponds to a target rate r j;target ¼ W 0j t log 2 ð1 þ G j;target Þ. However, if the B2D link's SINR is below the target threshold, then UE j will attempt to find a relay i Ã 2 U IDLE t ðjÞ through which it can meet the target rate while using the least power. UE j achieves this by solving the following mode and relay selection problem:
If there is a relay i Ã that is a solution to problem (4), and is willing to provide relay services, then UE j will receive data from the BS, through UE i Ã , in relay mode. If relay i Ã is not willing to provide relay services, then UE j can solve (4) again while excluding UE i Ã from the set of candidate relays. This process can be repeated a maximum of R times, or until there are no more candidate relays, whichever comes first. If there are no candidate relays, or none are willing to provide relay services, then UE j will receive data from the BS in direct mode. In problem (4), the rate constraint requires that the BS can meet the target transmission rate through the relay; the SINR constraint requires that the B2D link's SINR is below the target threshold; the power constraint requires that the relay's transmission power is below its maximum transmission power P max UE (23 dBm in an LTE network [48]); and the bandwidth (BW) constraints require that the BS-to-relay and relay-to-destination links use the same resources as the B2D link. Importantly, since the relay transmission is performed in two phases, the BW constraint W ij t ¼ W 0j t implies that the D2D link is given dedicated (orthogonal) resources. This is in contrast to a lot of work on D2D communications, which assumes that D2D links reuse uplink resources, e.g., [18] . In the case of downlink relaying, we believe that D2D relays should reuse downlink resources because they are helping the BS.
Virtual Token Exchange System
Performing a relay transmission costs energy and provides no benefit to the relay. Consequently, without proper incentives, no self-interested user would want her UE to relay data for other users. To overcome this problem, we incentivize relaying through the use of a virtual token exchange system. In our proposed system, UEs are initially endowed with a set 3 . Our framework can be applied without significant modification to any two-hop relaying scheme that uses a single intermediate relay (regardless of the relaying, mode selection, and relay selection strategies); however, the token system and optimization/learning framework would have to be adapted to work with either two-hop relaying strategies that use multiple relays or multi-hop relaying strategies. of tokens (e.g., by the device's manufacturer or by the network operator). A UE must "expend" one token in order to receive data through a relay, and a UE can only "earn" additional tokens by relaying data for other UEs. Importantly, if a UE does not have any tokens, then it cannot receive data through a relay, so it will default to receiving data directly from the BS. In this way, no user is worse off in the proposed system than in a network with only B2D communications.
Consider UE j 2 U DL t , which is scheduled to receive data from the BS in time slot t. Suppose that G 0j t < G j;target and that, after solving problem (4), it selects UE i Ã as a candidate relay. At this point, UE j sends a relay request to UE i Ã , which replies with either a positive or negative relay acknowledgement (R-ACK/R-NACK) indicating if it is willing to relay or not (in Sections 3 and 4, we describe how UE i Ã makes this decision). If UE j's request is R-ACK'd, then it receives data from the BS, through UE i Ã , in relay mode, and a virtual token transfer takes place (from UE j to UE i Ã ). If its request is R-NACK'd, then UE j will seek another relay as described in Section 2.1.2.
Similar to [30] , we assume that each UE is equipped with a secure and tamper proof hardware module, which is located between the UE's data link and physical layers. 4 The secure hardware module keeps track of how many electronic tokens the UE currently holds and helps manage the virtual token exchange process. 5 We say that the token exchange is virtual because tokens are not actually exchanged between UEs; instead, upon receiving data through a relay, a UE's token holding is automatically decreased by one, and upon completing a relay transmission, a UE's token holding is automatically incremented by one. In order to prevent malicious users from cheating the token system, we assume that the BS uses public-key cryptography to create digital signatures, which the relay and destination UEs can use to verify that messages were generated by the BS and, furthermore, verify that the messages were not tampered with. Secure token exchanges can also be achieved by combining cryptography with centralized accounting servers [29] . However, this requires messages to be sent between the UEs and a centralized accounting server, which can increase network overheads and introduce delays in the token exchange process.
UE Model
We now describe our model of UE j 2 f1; . . . ; Ng.
Token holding state. At any given time, UE j holds k j 2 K ¼ f0; 1; . . . ; T g tokens, where T is the total number of tokens in the network.
Relay budget state. Since UEs are mobile, they have limited battery energy. We let p j max represent the total amount of battery energy that the user is willing to consume relaying data for other users over one battery lifetime. With each relay transmission that UE j provides, it expends some energy and reduces its relay budget p j 2 ½0; p j max . When its relay budget reaches 0, UE j will no longer relay data for other UEs and can no longer receive relay service from other UEs; however, it will continue to receive data over the direct B2D link. In other words, p j ¼ 0 does not mean that the UE's battery is completely drained; it only means that the UE will no longer participate in the token system. We refer to p j ¼ 0 as the dead state and assume that p j is reset to p j max when the UE's battery is recharged. Importantly, the UE keeps any tokens that it holds when it enters the dead state and can use them once its battery is recharged. Note that, in our problem formulation, we assume that p j is continuous (see Section 3); however, as in [41] , we quantize p j in our simulation results to make the proposed optimization problem tractable.
The three parameters described in the following three paragraphs are used to characterize the network environment experienced by UE j. These parameters are unknown a priori and time-varying because, as summarized in Table 2 , they depend on various time-varying environmental factors. The definitions of these parameters are illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Outbound relay demand rate (ORDR). We let j denote the probability that UE j wants help from a relay. Given our illustrative mode and relay selection strategy, in which a UE seeks a relay if its SINR is below a target threshold (see Section 2.1.2), we have
which means that j is equivalent to the outage probability of the B2D link to UE j. j is non-zero because the BS has a finite maximum transmission power (46 dBm in an LTE network [48]). Importantly, j is the probability that UE j wants help from a relay, but it is not the probability that it actually receives help from a relay. For this reason, we refer to j as UE j's outbound relay demand rate. Inbound relay demand rate (IRDR). We let m j denote the probability that UE j is asked to relay data for another UE. We refer to m j as UE j's inbound relay demand rate. Note that, since UEs seek relays when there is a random outage event, inbound relay requests are also random. 
Environmental Parameters
Environmental Factors ORDR j IRDR m j RRE e j The UE's distance to nearest BS and channel conditions @ @ @ @ @ @ Locations, cooperation strategies, token holdings, and relay budgets of other UEs X @ @ @ @ 4. Examples of secure hardware modules in existing networks include SIM cards [38] , which are used for subscriber authentication, and EMV chips (EMV stands for Europay, Mastercard, and Visa), which are used for secure electronic payments (e.g., in Apple Pay [39] ).
5. Note that, since UEs will already have to be designed to support D2D relaying, integrating the secure hardware module will require very little additional engineering and cost overheads. Moreover, since consumers frequently upgrade their mobile handsets, UEs with these capabilities can be widely deployed in a reasonably short time frame (e.g., one-two years).
Relay recruitment efficiency (RRE). Let e j denote the jth UE's relay recruitment efficiency, which is defined as the following conditional probability:
In words, e j is the conditional probability that UE j gets help from a relay (i.e., receives a R-ACK), given that it requires a relay transmission, has at least one token to "pay" a relay, and has a non-zero relay budget. The RRE captures the fact that a UE may not be able to find a suitable candidate relay and, even if it is able to find a suitable candidate, the candidate may reject its relay request. Since the UEs have finite maximum transmission powers, only some UEs are suitable candidate relays as shown in (4) . Note that the unconditional probability that UE j receives a R-ACK can be written as j e j I fk j > 0;p j > 0g , where I A is an indicator variable that is set to 1 when the event A occurs and is set to 0 otherwise.
Cost and benefit. We let b j be the benefit gained by UE j when it receives data through a relay and let c j be the energy cost incurred by UE j when it provides a relay transmission. We assume that b j ¼ log 2 ð1 þ G j;target Þ bits/s/Hz, which is fixed for all relay transmissions, and that c j ¼ aDtP ji Joules, where P ji is the transmission power used by UE j to relay data to UE i. The constant a is set such that b j > c j ; if this condition does not hold, then UE's have no incentive to cooperate [35] .
Cooperation actions. When a UE receives a relay request, it must decide if it will R-ACK the request. We define the action set Aðp j Þ as a function of the UE's relay budget p j : i.e.,
where a j ¼ 1 2 Aðp j Þ (R-ACK) means that the UE is willing to act as a relay and a j ¼ 0 2 Aðp j Þ (R-NACK) means that it is not. 6 If the UE is in the dead state, then it cannot act as a relay. Cooperation policy. UE j's cooperation policy s j ðk j ; p j Þ 2 Aðp j Þ is a function, which maps its current token holding state k j and relay budget p j to a cooperation action a j 2 Aðp j Þ. Given its IRDR, token holding state, relay budget, and cooperation policy, the probability that UE j relays data for another UE in a time slot is m j s j ðk j ; p j ÞI fp j > 0g .
State evolution. We denote the UE's state by s j ¼ ðk j ; p j Þ 2 S, where k j 2 K ¼ f0; 1; . . . ; T g is its token holding state, p j 2 ½0; p j max is its relay budget, and S ¼ K Â ½0; p j max . When the UE acts as a relay, it gains one token and its relay budget reduces by c j : i.e., Act as a relay: ðk j ; p j Þ ! ðk j þ 1; p j À c j Þ:
When the UE uses a relay, it loses one token and its relay budget remains the same: i.e., Use a relay: ðk j ; p j Þ ! ðk j À 1; p j Þ:
Transition probability function. We let P j ð½k j0 ; p j0 j½k j ; p j ; a j Þ denote the state transition probability function, which gives the probability that UE j transitions from state s j ¼ ðk j ; p j Þ to state s j0 ¼ ðk j0 ; p j0 Þ after taking cooperation action a j . Based on (8) and (9), as well as the definitions of the ORDR 6. One may argue that Aðp j Þ ¼ f0; 1g only if p j > c j , where c j is the amount of energy required to relay. However, since p j is the relay energy budget and not the actual battery state, and c j ( p j max , we allow relay transmissions as long as p j > 0. This simplifies the model. j , IRDR m j , and RRE e j , the state transition probability function is defined as follows:
Intuitively, in each time slot, a UE can provide help as a relay, get help from a relay, or do neither: if UE j has non-zero tokens and a non-zero relay budget (i.e., I fk j > 0;p j > 0g ¼ 1), then with probability j e j it gets help and pays one token [line 1 in (10)]; if UE j has a non-zero relay budget (i.e., I fp j > 0g ¼ 1), then with probability m j a j it provides help, gains one token, and loses c j units of battery energy [line 2 in (10)]; if UE j has non-zero tokens and a non-zero relay budget, then with probability 1 À j e j À m j a j it neither gets help nor provides help [line 3 in (10)]; if UE j has zero tokens or is in the dead state (i.e., I fk j > 0;p j > 0g ¼ 0), then it cannot receive help; if UE j is in the dead state (i.e., I fp j > 0g ¼ 0), then it cannot provide help; and, all other cases occur with probability 0. Expected utility. Let u j ðk j ; p j ; a j Þ denote UE j's expected utility in state s j ¼ ðk j ; p j Þ when it takes cooperation action a j . The expected utility is defined as follows:
Intuitively, if UE j has non-zero tokens and a non-zero relay budget, then it gets help from a relay with probability j e j and receives benefit b j ; if UE j has a non-zero relay budget, then it provides help with probability m j a j and incurs cost c j ; and, if UE j has a zero relay budget, then it can neither provide help nor receive help, therefore, its utility within the token system is 0.
In Table 3 , we summarize the key differences between the system model used this paper and the system model used in our prior work [33] .
Balance of Earned and Expended Tokens
On average, a UE will only be able to get relay service as often as it provides relay service because it must earn as many tokens as it spends. In this section, we characterize this balance under some simplifying assumptions. Let k j;þ t ! 0 and k j;À t ! 0 denote the cumulative number of tokens earned and expended by UE j, respectively, from time slot 0 to time slot t and let k j 0 ! 0 denote its initial token allocation. Within the proposed token system, the following condition must always hold:
which indicates that the number of expended tokens cannot exceed the number of earned tokens plus the number of initial tokens. Suppose that UE j has an unlimited relay budget, and that its ORDR j , IRDR m j , and RRE e j are fixed so that we can study the steady-state behavior of (12). 7 If we divide both sides of (12) by t and take the limit as t ! 1, then we get Pr UE j receives help from a relay |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} À1 Token
Pr UE j provides help as a relay |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} þ1 Token ;
because UE j expends one token every time that it receives help from a relay and it earns one token every time that it provides help as a relay. The condition in (13) can be rewritten as:
where the left hand side is the probability that UE j uses a relay (and expends one token), the right hand side is the probability that UE j acts as a relay (and earns one token), E k j ½Á denotes the expectation over the UE's steady-state token holding distribution, E k j ½I fk j > 0g is the probability that UE j has non-zero tokens, and E k j ½s j ðk j ; p j Þ is the probability that UE j will R-ACK an inbound relay request. We If a UE's relay budget is finite, then there will be no token exchanges in steady-state. This is because, in steady-state, the UE's relay budget will be zero. By assuming that the relay budget is unlimited, we can use the steady-state behavior to approximate the behavior observed while the UE's relay budget is non-zero, but finite.
will refer back to (14) to understand many of the simulation results in Section 5.
OPTIMAL POLICY FOR A SINGLE UE
Recall that a UE's cooperation policy indicates whether or not it is willing to provide relay services given its current token holding and relay budget states. Determining a UE's optimal cooperation policy is a challenging problem because it not only depends on the UE's distance from the nearest BS and its channel conditions, but also on the other UEs' locations, channel conditions, token holdings, relay budgets, and cooperation policies (see Table 2 ). Since each UE may interact with many other UEs over the course of a day, it is impossible to perfectly model this coupling. Instead, we abstract the underlying environment and coupling among UEs in a compact, tractable, and intuitive way through each UE's environmental parameters, i.e., its ORDR j , IRDR m j , and RRE e j . These parameters can be thought of as beliefs that each UE has about the effect that the network environment and the other UE's have on it.
In this section, we formulate the problem of determining a UE's optimal cooperation policy with respect to its beliefs as an MDP [37] . Alternatively, we may think of this as the UE's best response policy [46] given that it is operating in an environment where its ORDR, IRDR, and RRE are fixed at certain values. We assume that a UE's environmental parameters (i.e., its beliefs) are known and fixed, and therefore its transition probability and utility functions are known and fixed. Later, in Section 4, we consider the case when these parameters are unknown a priori and time-varying. We formulate the MDP in Section 3.1 and then describe the structure of the optimal cooperation policy in Section 3.2.
Problem Formulation
Let u j t denote UE j's utility in time slot t and let E½u j t ¼ u j ðk j t ; p j t ; a j t Þ denote its expectation. Each UE aims to maximize its infinite horizon discounted utility 8 in which benefits and costs that are received t time steps in the future are discounted by the factor b t , where b 2 ½0; 1Þ: that is,
We assume that the discount factor b is a common parameter among all UEs and that it is set by the network operator. If b ¼ 0, then each UE only considers its immediate utility, and will therefore never choose to act as a relay (because it will incur cost c j without any immediate benefit to itself). In general, larger values of b compel each UE to look farther into the future to determine its optimal cooperation action at the present time. If the network environment is stationary, then discount factors closer to 1 will always lead to better long run performance; however, since the ORDR j , IRDR m j , and RRE e j are time-varying in practice, forecasts of the future may be inaccurate, so discount factors too close to 1 may actually lead to worse long run performance. Determining the optimal discount factor is out of the scope of this paper, but is an important problem for future research. We define UE j's optimal state value function V j ðk j ; p j Þ as the expected infinite horizon discounted utility that it will gain from each state if it executes the optimal policy s j ðk j ; p j Þ: that is,
The optimal state value function is unique and satisfies the following Bellman optimality equation: 
In (17), we also define the action-value function Q j ðk j ; p j ; a j Þ, which is the value of taking cooperation action a j in state s j ¼ ðk j ; p j Þ and then following the optimal policy thereafter. Given the action-value function, it is easy to determine the optimal cooperation policy: s j ðk j ; p j Þ ¼ arg max a j 2Aðp j Þ Q j ðk j ; p j ; a j Þ:
Importantly, if the cost and transition probability functions are known, then the optimal value function can be computed using the well-known value iteration algorithm:
j0 ;p j0 Þ2S P ð½k j0 ; p j0 j ½k j ; p j ; a j ÞV n ðk j0 ; p j0 Þ ( ) ;
where V j 0 ðk j ; p j Þ ¼ 0 for all s j ¼ ðk j ; p j Þ 2 S and V j n ðk j ; p j Þ converges to the optimal state-value function V j ðk j ; p j Þ as n ! 1 [37] . In general, the computational complexity of value iteration, per iteration, is quadratic in the number of states and linear in the number of actions. In the worst case, the number of iterations grows polynomially in 1=ð1 À bÞ, where b is the discount factor [42] .
In practice, the cost and transition probability functions are unknown a priori and time-varying (due to the fact that 8 . There are other optimization objectives that one might think to use; however, they are not well suited for the problem considered in this paper. For example, a finite horizon undiscounted utility objective [37] , i.e., E½ P h t¼0 u j t , results in a non-stationary cooperation policy, which requires a large amount of memory to store due to the long time horizons that are required in our optimization. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the learning solution we propose in Section 4 requires pre-computing and storing many cooperation strategies. Alternatively, we could use receding-horizon control [40] . However, due to the long time horizons required in our optimization, computing the optimal decision in each time step would be computationally infeasible. As another example, an infinite horizon undiscounted utility objective [37] , i.e., lim h!1 E½ P h t¼0 u j t =h, cannot be used for our problem because the Markov chain induced by any non-trivial cooperation policy (in which the UE chooses to cooperate) is non-ergodic. This is due to the fact that there is an absorbing state in the MDP. We have chosen to use an infinite horizon discounted formulation because it is guaranteed to have a stationary optimal policy regardless of the structure of the MDP, and it is less computationally complex than the finite-horizon case for long time horizons (corresponding to discount factors close to 1). the ORDR j , IRDR m j , and RRE e j are unknown and timevarying), so UE j cannot directly apply value iteration (19) to find the optimal policy; instead, it must learn its optimal cooperation policy online based on its experience. We propose a solution to the online problem in Section 4.
Threshold Policies
Our simulation results in Section 5.1 show that the optimal cooperation policy s j ðk j ; p j Þ [determined using (18) ] is threshold in the token state k j and that the threshold depends on the relay budget p j : i.e.,
where the threshold K th ðp j Þ is non-decreasing in p j . In other words, as a UE's relay budget decreases, it will not want to earn as many tokens because it will have less opportunities to use them before it enters the dead state; therefore, it uses a lower threshold. A rigorous proof of this result is left as future work; however, in [33] , we show that policies are threshold if UEs have unlimited relay budgets.
Since the optimal policies are threshold, they can be compactly represented. In Section 4, we exploit this property to significantly reduce the memory requirements of our proposed learning algorithm.
LEARNING THE OPTIMAL COOPERATION POLICY
Each UE experiences different environmental dynamics depending on the environmental factors listed in Table 2 and captures these dynamics through the three environmental parameters that are also listed in Table 2 (namely, its ORDR j , IRDR m j , and RRE e j ). In this section, we propose a simple low-complexity supervised learning algorithm that a UE can deploy to learn a near optimal cooperation policy s j ðk j ; p j Þ online, despite the fact that these three parameters are unknown and time-varying. 9 Our proposed learning algorithm comprises an offline phase and an online phase. In the online phase, UE j estimates its ORDR j , IRDR m j , and RRE e j . Then, in each time slot, UE j selects its cooperation policy based on the estimated values. In principle, UE j could use these estimated values to populate the transition probability and utility functions defined in (10) and (11), respectively, and then use value iteration [see (19) ] to compute the corresponding optimal cooperation policy; however, frequently recomputing the optimal policy online would be computationally prohibitive.
For this reason, we propose to first compute a collection of cooperation policies offline, which correspond to a representative set of discretized environmental parameters, and then use a simple look-up table to select UE j's cooperation policy online in each time slot. To reduce the size of the look-up table, instead of estimating the ORDR j and RRE e j independently, we directly estimate p j ¼ j e j 2 ½0; 1=2, which we refer to as the outbound relay success rate. Note that the maximum outbound relay success rate is 1 / 2 because, on average, a UE can only receive relay service as often as it provides relay service (see Section 2.4). Additionally, since the optimal policy is threshold in the token state (see Section 3.2), each policy can be represented compactly with only one threshold value per relay budget state.
We provide pseudo-code for the offline and online phases in Tables 4 and 5 , respectively, and we describe each phase in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. In Section 4.3, we provide some remarks on the existence of equilibria and convergence to equilibrium in this multi-user problem.
Offline Phase
Let P ¼ fp 1 ; p 2 ; . . . ; p X g, M ¼ fm 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m Y g, and C ¼ fc 1 ; c 2 ; . . . ; c Z g be finite sets containing representative values of the outbound relay success rate, IRDR, and relay cost, respectively. In the offline phase of the proposed learning algorithm, we compute the collection of policies sðk; p j f p; m; cÞ : p 2 P; m 2 M; c 2 Cg. To compute the policy sðk; p j p; m; cÞ, we first populate the transition probability and utility functions defined in (10) and (11) , respectively, with p, m, and c in place of j e j , m j , and c j (lines 3-4 in Table 4 ). Subsequently, we use value iteration to compute the optimal value function and cooperation policy corresponding to p, m, and c (lines 5-6 in Table 4 ).
Since the sets of possible outbound relay success rates, IRDRs, and relay costs are discretized into X, Y , and Z values, respectively, a total of XYZ policies must be computed For each ðp; m; cÞ 2 P Â M Â C % Recall that p ¼ e 3.
Populate the transition probability function P ð½k 0 ; p 0 j ½k; p; aÞ as defined in (10) 4.
Populate the utility function uðk; p; aÞ as defined in (11) 5.
Calculate optimal state-value function V ðk; pÞ using value iteration (19) 6.
Calculate the optimal cooperation policy sðk; pÞ using (18) 7.
Record the optimal cooperation policy sðk; p j p; m; cÞ sðk; pÞ 8.
End 9.
Output: Collection of policies fsðk; pjp; m; cÞ : p 2 P; m 2 M; c 2 Cg 9. We do not use a more conventional reinforcement learning based approach, such as a Q-learning [37] , because our problem does not satisfy the required convergence conditions. Specifically, Q-learning requires that all state-action pairs are visited "infinitely often": that is, in the limit as t ! 1, every action must be taken in every state an infinite number of times. This condition does not hold for our problem because the relay energy budget is non-increasing in time. We refer the interested reader to our technical report [47] for an in depth study of the shortcomings of traditional reinforcement learning algorithms in the context of our problem. offline and stored in a look-up table. Assuming that the relay budget is discretized into W values, the total amount of memory required to store the look-up table is OðWXYZÞ (because each policy can be compactly represented with one threshold value per relay budget state). For example, if each variable is discretized into 10 values, and the threshold is represented by one byte, then the lookup table will require 10 KB of memory.
Importantly, the offline phase can be performed before the consumer purchases her cellular device and the collection of optimal policies can be preloaded onto the device (e.g., by the device's manufacturer or by the network operator). Additionally, the offline phase can be performed again whenever the consumer changes her relaying preferences, i.e., changes her maximum relay budget p j max . In either case, the policy look-up table is computed offline so there are no real-time requirements on the computation. Hence, the complexity of value iteration (see Section 3.1) is quite reasonable for our purposes.
Online Phase
In the online portion of the algorithm, each UE maintains online estimates of its outbound relay success rate p j , denoted byp j t , and its IRDR m j , denoted bym j t . These estimates can be determined using a stochastic approximation of successful outbound relay requests and inbound relay requests, respectively (lines 11-12 in Table 5 ). Upon receiving an inbound relay request (line 6 in Table 5 ), UE j evaluates the energy cost c j t it will incur if it provides a relay transmission (line 8 in Table 5 ). UE j then takes the action a j t ¼ s j ðk j t ; p j t j fðp j t Þ; gðm j t Þ; hðc j t ÞÞ, where f : ½0; 1=2 ! P maps the estimatep j t to the nearest value in P, g : ½0; 1 ! M maps the estimatem j t to the nearest value in M, and h : ½0; 1 ! C maps the cost c j t to the nearest value in C (line 9 in Table 5 ). If the true parameters (i.e., p j and m j ) are fixed, and the sequence of step-sizes satisfy the following wellknown stochastic approximation conditions P 1 t¼0 h t ¼ 1 and P 1 t¼0 ðh t Þ 2 < 1, then our estimates converge with probability 1. Both of the above conditions can be met by setting h t ¼ 1=ðt þ 1Þ, which results in an unbiased estimate of the environmental parameters. In practice, however, the parameters that we are trying to estimate are not fixed. In fact, they change over time because they depend on the UE's distance from the nearest BS, the underlying channel conditions, and, importantly, the locations of other UEs, their token holdings, their relay budgets, and their cooperation policies. In this situation, there is no guarantee on convergence (or unbiased estimation), but it is possible to "track" the true parameters by using a constant small step-size, i.e., h t ¼ 1=w, where w is a fixed window size.
In summary, the online phase requires estimating two parameters and then using a simple table look-up to determine the cooperation action. Hence, the online phase's complexity is negligible. Using this online algorithm, each UE can autonomously adapt to its experienced environment in order to optimize its utility.
Remarks on Convergence to Equilibrium
It is interesting to consider whether or not there exists an equilibrium in the considered problem and, if so, if the proposed learning algorithm can converge to it. Interestingly, under the assumption that each UE's ORDR, IRDR, and RRE are time-varying, there is no equilibrium. This is because equilibrium concepts in game theory (Nash equilibrium, Markov perfect equilibrium, etc.) are not designed to study problems where the underlying dynamics are timevarying. Note that it is argued in [43] , [44] that the focus on equilibrium in multi-agent learning problems is often misguided. This is because an equilibrium may identify a condition when learning can stop, but it does not necessarily represent the goal of the learning process. Moreover, there are potentially multiple equilibria, and there is no way to coordinate the agents to achieve a particular equilibrium (i.e., there are no performance guarantees). Thus, instead of focusing on equilibrium, our learning algorithm takes the approach advocated in [43] , [44] : in dynamic environments comprising multiple autonomous and selfish learning agents (i.e., the UEs), the agents should not converge to a stationary policy, but should instead constantly adapt to changes in the environment.
SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present our simulation results. In Section 5.1, we present several numerical results to highlight the structure of the optimal cooperation policies. In Section 5.2, we describe the simulation setup that is used in Sections 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. In Section 5.3, we highlight the key differences between the proposed approach to cooperation (in which users are self-interested and must be incentivized to cooperate using the token system) and the conventional approach (in which users are obedient and are obliged to cooperate even if it is not in their self-interest). Then, in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, we investigate how UEs' mobilities and relay budgets impact their own performance, the performance of other UEs, and the overall network performance within the proposed framework. Finally, in Section 5.6, we study the impact of the network-wide token supply on the overall network performance. 
1.
Initialize: k j 0 , p j 0 ¼ p j max ,p j 0 ,m j 0 , fðÁÞ, gðÁÞ, hðÁÞ, w 2.
For t ¼ 0; 1; . . .
3.
outbound success 0 and inbound request 0 4.
If k j t > 0 and p j t > 0 and UE j has a successful outbound relay request 5.
outbound success 1 6.
Else if p j t > 0 and UE j receives an inbound relay request 7.
inbound request 1 8.
Determine energy cost c j t for relay transmission 9.
Take cooperation action a j t s j ðk j t ; p j t j fðp j t Þ; gðm j t Þ; hðc j t ÞÞ 10.
End
13.
Determine the next state as describe in Section 2.3 14.
Structure of the Optimal Policy
In this section, we present several figures to highlight the structure of the optimal cooperation policy. Throughout this section, we fix certain parameters to illustrate the general behavior of the optimal cooperation policy with respect to other parameters. We specify the fixed parameters in each figure's title. For illustration, we assume that each relay budget state allows the UE to R-ACK 100 relay requests on average (e.g., being in relay budget state 3 enables the UE to R-ACK 300 relay requests on average). Fig. 2 shows an illustrative optimal cooperation policy sðk; pÞ. As we discussed in Section 3.2, the optimal policy is threshold in the token state k, and the threshold is non-decreasing in the relay budget p. Fig. 3a illustrates how the optimal cooperation threshold varies with respect to the discount factor b and the cost-to-benefit ratio c=b (note that the policy depends on the cost-to-benefit ratio rather than the absolute costs and benefits [35] ). The optimal cooperation threshold is non-decreasing in b because, if a UE looks farther ahead, then it anticipates more opportunities to use additional tokens, and therefore has more incentive to earn tokens. Additionally, as we proved in our prior work [33] , the optimal threshold decreases as the cost-to-benefit ratio c=b increases. Fig. 3b illustrates how the optimal decision threshold varies with respect to the cost-to-benefit ratio c=b and IRDR m. The optimal decision threshold increases as the IRDR decreases because, if a UE is asked to relay infrequently, then it has incentive to earn tokens whenever it has the opportunity. This follows from the balance equation (14) . Fig. 3c illustrates how the optimal decision threshold varies with respect to the cost-to-benefit ratio c=b and the outbound relay success rate p ¼ e. The optimal decision threshold decreases as the outbound relay success rate decreases. This happens because, if a UE is unable to successfully recruit relays, then it does not have incentive to gather many tokens. This also follows from the balance equation (14) .
Cellular Network Simulation Setup
In our illustrative simulation setup, we assume that N ¼ 3000 mobile transceivers are uniformly and randomly distributed in a 3.75 km Â 3.75 km square area containing 25 cells with size 750 m Â 750 m. There is one BS at the center of each cell. UEs move according to a random waypoint mobility model that is commonly used in the simulation of mobile networks [45] . We use a time slot duration of Dt ¼ 100 ms, which implies that downlink resources are allocated every 100 ms and that the channel is invariant over this allocated time. In practice, the time slot duration would be shorter to match the time-scale at which cellular networks schedule resources (e.g., 1-10 ms) and to ensure channel coherence in each time slot; however, in order to observe the effect of mobility on the system's performance, we need to operate on a larger time-scale. This is not a limitation of our proposed framework, but is instead a limitation of our ability to simulate a large-scale network at a small time-scale for many time slots. In particular, in our simulator, using a 10 ms time slot duration to simulate, e.g., 1 hour of real-time system operation, requires 10 times more computer time and memory than using a 100 ms time slot duration.
We divide UEs into two mobility classes and two relay budget classes:
1. High mobility users move at 50-120 km/hour. For instance, users in motor vehicles are considered high mobility users. These users play different roles in the network over time because sometimes they will be far from (close to) a base station where they will have high ORDRs (high IRDRs). 2. Low mobility users move at 0-8 km per hour. For example, users in offices, restaurants, or on foot are considered to be low mobility users. Due to their limited mobility, these users typically do not switch roles over time and their ORDRs and IRDRs are relatively static. 3. High relay budget UEs can R-ACK many relay requests before entering the dead state. 4. Low relay budget UEs can R-ACK fewer relay requests before entering the dead state. The high and low relay budgets are specified separately for each of our simulations.
In order to compute the policy look-up table (see Table 4 ), we quantize the relay budget state into 11 bins (one representing the dead state) and we limit the maximum token holding for each UE to 65, which is larger than the highest cooperation threshold so that the limit does not affect the optimal policy. For the channel model, we consider path loss and shadow fading such that,
where P rx and P tx are the receive and transmit powers (in dB), respectively, L is the path loss, and x represents lognormal shadowing. For BS-to-UE communication, we use the 3GPP recommended path loss model for urban macro environments with antenna height 15 m above the average rooftop level and carrier frequency 2 GHz (Section 5.3.3 of [48]). The path loss model for UE-to-UE (D2D) communications is not standardized yet so we use the model described in Table 6 . Finally, we assume that there are T ¼ 32;000 tokens in the network that are uniformly and randomly distributed among the UEs at the start of the simulation. We discuss the impact of the token supply in Section 5. 6 . More details about the simulation parameters are provided in Table 6 . Before discussing our results, we need to introduce three new definitions:
R-ACK rate: The R-ACK rate is the probability that, upon receiving a relay request, a UE sends a R-ACK. Under the assumptions in Section 2.4, the R-ACK rate is equivalent to E k j ½s j ðk j ; p j Þ. Modified RRE: The modified RRE is the product of the RRE e j and the indicator function I fk j > 0g , i.e., e j I fk j > 0g . It can be interpreted as the probability that a UE has a token and receives relay service given that it requires a relay. Throughput gain: The throughput gain is the ratio of the actual throughput to the direct transmission throughput. Since the actual throughput is always greater than or equal to the direct throughput, the minimum throughput gain is 1. Note that a throughput gain of 1 is achieved if users are self-interested and the token system is not in place to incentivize cooperation.
Comparison to Conventional Relaying
The key assumption in this paper is that UEs are selfinterested, i.e., they aim to maximize their own utilities and do not care about the overall network performance. Since relaying costs energy and provides no benefit to the relay, self-interested UEs will never cooperate without proper incentives. Consequently, without the proposed token system, selfinterested UEs would not achieve more than the direct B2D throughput. In contrast, the typical assumption in the cooperative communications literature (e.g., [3] , [4] , [5] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] ) is that UEs are obedient, i.e., they will always cooperate. To highlight the key differences between a network of self-interested UEs and a network of obedient UEs, we compare the following three scenarios: (i) Proposed: All UEs are self-interested, have finite relay budgets, and are incentivized to cooperate using tokens; (ii) Obedient (infinite budget): All UEs are obedient and have unlimited relay budgets; (iii) Obedient (finite budget): All UEs are obedient and have limited relay budgets.
For illustration, we assume that 30 percent (70 percent) of UEs have high (low) mobility and that 70 percent (30 Figs. 4a and 4b , we compare the cumulative distribution of the users' average throughput gains and average utilities, respectively, obtained in the three aforementioned scenarios over 18,000 time slots. From Fig. 4a , it is clear that the overall network performance is best in the case when all users are obedient and have infinite relay budgets. However, Fig. 4b shows that over 20 percent (600) of the individual UEs in the network actually obtain negative average utilities, and are therefore being obliged to cooperate even though it is not in their self-interest. These poor performing UEs typically have low mobility and are in the core of the network so they end up providing relay service more frequently than they can exploit it. In contrast, the low mobility users at the periphery of the network tend to perform very well because they end up exploiting relay service more frequently than they provide it. In effect, the low mobility users at the periphery are free-riders: they benefit from cooperation without bearing its costs. We note that the throughput gains for the obedient users with infinite relay budgets closely match results in [18] , which show that 10 percent of users achieve over 218 percent gains compared to direct transmission alone.
When all users are obedient, but have finite relay budgets, the overall network performance degrades relative to the infinite budget case [see Fig. 4a ]. This performance degradation occurs for two reasons: (i) many low budget and low mobility UEs in the core of a cell provide relay service very frequently; consequently, they enter the dead state before making it to the periphery of a cell where they could balance out their average utility by exploiting relay service more frequently (as some low mobility users do in the infinite budget case); and (ii) as the low budget UEs enter the dead state, the density of active UEs in the network decreases leading to higher relay costs for all remaining UEs and less opportunities to use relays. While the overall network performance is better than the case with self-interested users, Fig. 4b shows that over 30 percent (900) of the UEs in the network actually obtain negative average utilities.
When all users are self-interested and have limited relay budgets, the overall network performance is lower than when all users are obedient [see Fig. 4a ]; however, Fig. 4b shows that over 97 percent (2, 910) of the individual UEs in the network obtain positive average utilities. Note that the few self-interested UEs that obtain (very small) negative average utilities each provided relay service a few more times than they exploited relay service just before the simulation ended; importantly, unlike in the cases with obedient users, the negative average utilities do not reflect a fundamental absence of incentive to relay, but are simply an artifact of the finite simulation duration.
Impact of Mobility
In this section, we investigate how each UE's mobility impacts its own performance, the performance of other UEs, and the overall network performance. We consider five mobility mixtures in which the network comprises 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 percent high mobility users, and the remaining users have low mobility. We assume that all users can relay an average of 300 times before entering the dead state. In this way, very few UEs enter the dead state so we do not conflate the impact of low relay budgets with the impact of mobility (we consider heterogeneous relay budgets in Section 5.5). In Fig. 5 , we plot the average ORDR , average IRDR m, average modified RRE eI fk > 0g , average relay lifetime (i.e., the time until a UE enters the dead state), average R-ACK rate, and average throughput gain over 18,000 time slots for users in each mobility class (i.e., high and low) and for all users combined. The lower and upper error bars in Fig. 5 show the 25th and 90th percentiles, respectively, over the considered sets of users.
ORDR and IRDR. Figs. 5a and 5b illustrate the UEs' average ORDRs and average IRDRs, respectively. Recall that, at the beginning of the simulation, users are uniformly distributed throughout the network. Since the low mobility users do not significantly deviate from their starting positions, and the high mobility users move throughout the network, the average ORDR for users in each class is approximately the same. At the same time, the average IRDRs of the low mobility users are typically lower because there is less overall area in the network where good candidate relays reside (because candidate relays need to have good connections to the BS and the outage UE). Interestingly, the spread of ORDRs and IRDRs within each class varies. In particular, the low mobility users have a larger range of ORDRs and IRDRs because, if they are at the periphery (core) of a cell, then they will have large (small) ORDRs and small (large) IRDRs. In contrast, the high mobility users move between the peripheries and cores of cells over time, and therefore experience less deviation in these parameters.
Modified RRE and R-ACK rate. Figs. 5c and 5d illustrate the UEs' average modified RREs and average R-ACK rates, respectively. Importantly, these parameters are intimately tied to each user's ORDR and IRDR through the balance equation (14) . On average, low mobility users have lower modified RREs and more variation in their modified RREs and R-ACK Rates. This is because low mobility users typically have imbalanced ORDRs and IRDRs. If a UE's ORDR is larger than its IRDR, i.e., > m, then it tends to run out of tokens [i.e., E k ½I fk > 0g will be small]. Without tokens, it cannot recruit relays, which reduces its modified RRE. At the same time, its ACK Rate will be high because it will R-ACK incoming relay requests with high probability to earn tokens. On the other hand, if a UE's ORDR is smaller than its IRDR, i.e., < m, then it will tend to collect a surplus of tokens and not have any incentive to R-ACK incoming relay requests, thereby reducing its R-ACK rate. Note that, when a UE has a low R-ACK rate, it potentially reduces the other UEs' modified RREs.
Average relay lifetime. Fig. 5e illustrates the UEs' average relay lifetimes. As we noted earlier, we selected the relay budgets such that very few UEs enter the dead state.
Throughput gain. Fig. 5f illustrates the UEs' average throughput gains. Having a higher fraction of high mobility users in the network improves the throughput gain because they facilitate the exchange of tokens between the peripheries and cores of the cells.
Impact of the Relay Budget
Users will select different relay budgets based on their preferences. In this section, we study how each UE's relay budget impacts its own performance, the performance of other UEs, and the overall network performance. As in Section 5.3, we assume that UEs with high (low) relay budgets can relay 300 (100) times on average before entering the dead state. We consider five mixtures in which the network comprises 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 percent users with high relay budgets, and the remaining users have low relay budgets. We assume that all users have high mobility so we can separate the impact of users with low relay budgets from the impact of users with low mobility. In Fig. 6 , we plot the same information as in Fig. 5 , but for users in each relay budget class (i.e., high and low) and for all users combined. Note that all metrics are measured over the lifetime of each user. The total simulation duration is 18,000 time slots.
ORDR and IRDR. Figs. 6a and 6b illustrate the UEs' average ORDRs and average IRDRs, respectively. We observe that the relay budget has an insignificant impact on the ORDR and a moderate impact on the IRDR of the high relay budget users. Specifically, as the number of UEs in the dead state increases, there are less UEs in the network that require help from relays, and therefore the high relay budget UEs' IRDRs decrease.
RRE and R-ACK rate. Figs. 6c and 6d illustrate the UEs' average RREs and average R-ACK rates, respectively. When there are many UEs with low relay budgets in the network, the average modified RRE and average R-ACK rate are lower than when there are many UEs with high relay budgets. This is because UEs with low relay budgets have lower thresholds in their optimal cooperation policies [see Fig. 2 ]; therefore, many low relay budget UEs have sufficient tokens and, consequently, have no incentive to R-ACK incoming relay requests. Interestingly, when the low relay budget UEs carry less than the average number of tokens, the high relay budget UEs must carry more than the average number of tokens; therefore, more of the high relay budget UEs will also have sufficient tokens and, consequently, have no incentive to R-ACK incoming relay requests. This interesting phenomenon can be compensated for by reducing the token supply in the network so that UEs hold fewer tokens and have more incentive to R-ACK incoming relay requests. We further discuss the impact of the token supply on the overall network performance in Section 5.6. Since the R-ACK rate and IRDR are increasing in the number of high budget UEs, and the ORDR is similar across mixtures, it follows from the balance Eq. (14) that the modified RRE must also be increasing in the number of high budget UEs.
Average relay lifetime. Fig. 6e illustrates the UEs' average relay lifetimes. The average relay lifetime (for UEs with both high and low relay budgets) decreases slightly as the number of high relay budget UEs increases because the IRDR and R-ACK rate are slightly higher.
Throughput gain. Fig. 6f illustrates the UEs' average throughput gains. The throughput gain is high (low) when the modified RRE and R-ACK rate are high (low).
Impact of the Token Supply
The number of tokens in the network is an important design parameter that can significantly impact the network throughput. In Fig. 7 , we illustrate the impact of the token supply on the throughput gain using token supplies ranging from 0 to 124,000 in 4,000 token increments. The results in Fig. 7 were generated with 30 percent high mobility and 70 percent high relay budget UEs; however, the general trend does not depend on the specific mixture of users. For our simulation settings, the best overall network performance is achieved when there are 32,000-64,000 tokens in the network. Interestingly, having too few or too many tokens will significantly reduce the overall network throughput. This phenomenon can be explained as follows: On the one hand, if there are too few tokens in the network, then many UEs will have zero tokens and therefore be unable to "buy" relay service when they need it. In the extreme case that there are zero tokens, there is no incentive for the self-interested UEs to provide relay services, so the average network throughput will be equivalent to that of a network with only direct B2D transmission. On the other hand, if there are too many tokens in the network, then many UEs will have "sufficient" tokens (i.e., k j > K th ðp j Þ) and will therefore have no incentive to provide relay service (i.e., s j ðk j ; p j Þ ¼ 0).
CONCLUSION
We consider a cellular network in which self-interested users are incentivized to relay data for each other using tokens. We formulate the decision problem faced by each UE (i.e., whether or not to provide relay service) as a Markov decision process. We show that the optimal cooperation policies are threshold in a UE's token holding state, and that the threshold increases in the UE's relay budget state. In practice, a UE's optimal policy not only depends on its distance from the nearest base station and its channel conditions, but also on the other UEs' locations, channel conditions, token holdings, relay budgets, and cooperation policies. To cope with this, we propose a supervised learning algorithm that enables each UE to learn its optimal cooperation policy online based on its experience. In the proposed algorithm, a UE estimates two parameters from its interactions with the network environment and then uses these estimates to select its cooperation policy from a pre-computed look-up table.
We evaluate the proposed learning algorithm in various deployment scenarios involving both high and low mobility users and UEs with both high and low relay budgets. Our simulation results show that (i) having more high mobility users results in a more consistent exchange of tokens between the peripheries and cores of cells, which improves the average throughput gains of all UEs (especially of the low mobility UEs); (ii) having more UEs in the dead state reduces the opportunities for the remaining UEs to spend and earn tokens, which reduces the average throughput gains of the remaining UEs; (iii) having too few tokens in the network results in UEs not having tokens available when they need help from a relay; and (iv) having too many tokens in the network results in UEs having sufficient tokens and, therefore, no incentive to provide relay service. Our results also show that the conventional approach to cooperation results in approximately 30 percent of users obtaining negative average utilities because they are obliged to cooperate. In contrast, the proposed solution protects users from providing relay services significantly more than they receive relay services, resulting in less than 3 percent of users obtaining (very small) negative average utilities. Lastly, within the token system, users achieve 20 percent throughput gains on average -and 40 percent throughput gains at the 90th percentile -compared to B2D communications alone.
